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Abstract In a recent issue of Cognitive Neurodynamics
Farwell (Cogn Neurodyn 6:115–154, 2012) published a
comprehensive tutorial review of the use of Event Related
Brain Potentials (ERP) in the detection of concealed
information. Farwell’s review covered much of his own
work employing his ‘‘brain fingerprinting’’ technology. All
his work showed a 100 % accuracy rate in detecting con-
cealed information. We argue in this comment that Farwell
(Cogn Neurodyn 6:115–154, 2012) is misleading and
misrepresents the scientific status of brain fingerprinting
technology.
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In a recent issue of Cognitive Neurodynamics Farwell
(Farwell 2012) published a comprehensive tutorial review
of the use of event related brain potentials (ERPs) in the
detection of concealed information. Farwell’s review cov-
ered much of his own work employing his ‘‘brain finger-
printing’’ technology. According to the author, he and his
colleagues ‘have tested brain fingerprinting technology in
over 200 cases, including over a dozen scientific studies as
well as individual forensic cases involving real-life crimes
and other events’ (Farwell 2012 p. 135). All these studies
achieved a 100 % accuracy rate in detecting concealed
information. We argue in this comment that Farwell (2012)
is misleading and misrepresents the scientific status of
brain fingerprinting technology.
Concealed information detection, brain fingerprinting
and the P300
Brain fingerprinting is a variant of the Guilty Knowledge or
Concealed Information Test (GKT/CIT; Lykken 1959,
1960). The CIT aims to determine the presence or absence
of crime-related information in a suspect’s memory. It has
been used with a variety of dependent measures, most
notably with recordings of autonomic nervous system
(ANS) measures, such as skin conductance (Ben-Shakhar
and Elaad 2003). The variant of the CIT with ERPs was
first investigated in the late 80ties (Farwell and Donchin
1986; Rosenfeld et al. 1988). A number of different pro-
tocols that use the P300 waveform to assess recognition of
crime details have been developed, including the Farwell
and Donchin (1991) protocol, which Farwell later labeled
‘brain fingerprinting’.
The brain fingerprinting approach is based on research
on the P300 component, a positive brain potential that
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occurs between approximately 300 and 800 ms after
stimulus presentation. The P300 is typically elicited in a so
called oddball paradigm (Donchin 1981). In this paradigm
the participants are presented with a sequence of events,
with each event belonging to one of two categories. Nor-
mally events belonging to one of the categories are pre-
sented only rarely, and these events elicit a more
pronounced P300. The logic underlying P300-based CIT is
that as the crime relevant stimuli form a distinct-rare cat-
egory relative to more frequently presented irrelevant
stimuli and consequently they will elicit an enhanced P300
only in knowledgeable (guilty) participants.
Misrepresentation
Farwell (2012) misrepresents the status of brain finger-
printing throughout his article. Using grandiloquent lan-
guage [‘Prior to the invention of brain fingerprinting, the
state of the art in forensic science, investigations, and
criminal justice was as follows’ (Farwell 2012, p. 116)], he
suggests his method revolutionized the forensic science. As
explained above, brain fingerprinting is a variant of the
CIT, which has been successfully applied with ANS mea-
sures for decades. Farwell erroneously claims that the ANS
measures used in the CIT measure deception, while his
brain fingerprinting measures recognition of crime details
(Farwell 2012 p. 117). In fact, even though ANS measures
and ERPs do not necessarily tap the same psychological
process, both can and have been successfully used for the
detection of crime details.
Considerable research since the discovery of the P300
by Sutton et al. (1965), has established that the P300 is
elicited by any event that violates the subject’s expectan-
cies. In fact, in various studies conducted in Donchin’s lab
in the 70s and 80s, it was noted that occasionally some
frequent events that were meaningful to some participants
elicited a P300, and it was these observations that ulti-
mately led to the P300 based CIT published in Farwell and
Donchin (1991). Thus, there is no simple one-to-one rela-
tionship between the P300 and memory. Even though
information stored in memory may very well cause some
events to be identified as distinct and therefore elicit a
P300, reducing the P300 to a simple ‘‘Aha!’’ response
driven by ‘recognition of the relevant information con-
tained in the probes as significant in the context of the
crime’ (Farwell 2012, p. 149) is quite at variance with what
is known about the P300.
The P300-MERMER, a response that Farwell claims to
have discovered and for which he obtained a patent, is
unlikely to solve the problem caused by the lack of a one-
to-one relationship between P300 and memory. Farwell
describes this P300-MERMER as the response including
the P300, a late negative peak and a short-term shift in the
frequency of the EEG signal. Yet the exact definition of the
P300-MERMER remains vague and unclear (see Rosenfeld
2005 for an extended discussion), and as far as we can tell,
Farwell never published any data in peer reviewed journals
showing that the P300-MERMER has any incremental
validity beyond the P300 alone. Interestingly, the Univer-
sity of Illinois patented the original P300 based CIT as
published in Farwell and Donchin (1991). And conve-
niently, the ‘discovery’ and patenting of the MERMER
liberates him from the constraints of this earlier patent.
Farwell (2012) reviews of brain fingerprinting studies
Farwell (2012) reviewed and summarized 13 of his own
studies (see tables 2 and 3 in Farwell (2012)). More spe-
cifically, these tables include 3 laboratory studies with a
total of 73 participants and 10 field/real-life studies with a
total of 132 participants. All these studies show 100 %
accuracy in the detection of both the presence or absence of
critical information.
However, a close inspection of the studies listed by
Farwell (2012) leads to a much less optimistic view of the
brain fingerprinting technology. First, of the 3 laboratory
studies listed, only 1 (Farwell and Donchin 1991; Experi-
ment 1) was published in a peer reviewed journal. Farwell
lists 40 participants under this study (see Farwell 2012;
table 2), but in fact it included only 20 participants, each
tested twice (once in a guilty and once in an innocent
condition) in a within subject design. The other two studies
are merely brief conference abstracts (Farwell and Donchin
1988; Farwell and Richardson 2006a), and not articles
published in peer reviewed journals. Needless to say, such
conference abstracts do not contain sufficient details to
judge the merits of the study, let alone allow for replica-
tion. Moreover, the 4 participants from Farwell and Don-
chin (1988) are reported twice as they were also included in
Experiment 1 of Farwell and Donchin (1991). In sum,
laboratory research on brain fingerprinting published in
peer-reviewed journals amounts to a single study contain-
ing 20 participants.
Of the 10 studies that Farwell calls field/real-life studies,
only 2 were published in peer reviewed journals. Farwell
and Donchin (1991; Experiment 2) contained 4 partici-
pants—not 8 as listed in table 3 of Farwell (2012)—who
were tested on minor real life crimes such as underage
drinking (guilty condition) and on crimes committed by
other participants (innocent condition). The other peer
reviewed article (Farwell and Smith 2001) contained 6
participants who were tested on specific issues such as
presence at a birthday party celebration in a restaurant.
Three of them were tested on their own biographical data
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(guilty), while the other 3 were tested on information they
were not aware of (innocent). All other studies listed are
either conference presentations (Farwell 2009), or abstracts
(Farwell 1992, 2008; Farwell and Donchin 1986; Farwell
and Richardson 2006b; Farwell et al. 2011). Once again,
the same 4 participants are listed twice in Table 3 of Far-
well (2012), as two different studies (each time as 8 par-
ticipants), once under Farwell and Donchin (1986) and then
again under ‘‘real life Experiment 200 (Farwell and Donchin
1986, 1991; Farwell 1992).
In sum, the peer reviewed data on brain fingerprinting
published by Farwell and his colleagues is limited to 3 datasets
with a total of 30 participants, published in two peer reviewed
articles. In total, 48 correct and 6 indeterminate decisions were
made in these data sets (see Table 1).
Selection bias
Farwell’s finding of 100 % accuracy stands in sharp con-
trast with the available literature (See Rosenfeld 2011 for a
review), and is based upon a highly selective review.
Farwell (2012) posits 20 scientific standards for brain fin-
gerprinting tests. Failure to meet these standards would
explain the lower accuracy obtained by other studies. These
twenty standards, however, represents merely Farwell’s
subjective views, rather than a consensus within the rele-
vant scientific community. More importantly, Farwell uses
these standards selectively. He neglects to mention that
studies demonstrating high detection accuracy rates also
fail to meet some of these standards. In fact, his own work
(Farwell and Donchin 1991) fails to meet some of these
standards.
A case in point here is Farwell’s standard 4 stipulating
that stimuli designated as targets should also be crime
related. The original design of Farwell and Donchin (1991)
embedded the crime relevant details in a classical oddball
sequence among frequent irrelevant events. Some of the
frequent irrelevant events were designated as targets and
required a deviant button press. These targets had abso-
lutely no relationship to the crime (‘relevant to task, not to
crime’; Farwell and Donchin 1991, Table 1) and merely
created a known rare category thereby providing a baseline
of the subject’s normal P300. It is only under these cir-
cumstances that the elicitation of a P300 by the crime
relevant events can be properly interpreted. Farwell, for
some unexplained reason, now advocates the use of crime
relevant events as targets, creating a different protocol. Yet
he fails to discuss that Farwell and Donchin (1991) does
not meet this standard.
Besides failing to meet standard 4, Farwell and Donchin
(1991) also fails to meet standards 8 and 10. Yet for studies
demonstrating less impressive accuracy rates, he hastens to
indicate which of the standards they fail to meet. Similarly,
studies demonstrating that brain fingerprinting is sensitive
to countermeasures are dismissed because they do not
meet all of the 20 standards, while no peer reviewed data
showing that Farwell’s technique is highly resistant to
countermeasures are provided.
It is important to realize that the need to publish data in
refereed journals is not a merely formal requirement. Only
experts in the field are capable of conducting a proper
evaluation of the methods employed, the research meth-
odology and statistical analyses used by the researcher and
consequently assess the merits of the reported results.
Furthermore a recent article (Simmons et al. 2011) dem-
onstrated that inflated effect sizes are often reported even in
peer reviewed journals when the methods, procedures and
data analysis techniques are not properly described. All the
cited Farwell studies except perhaps two did not even come
close to meeting the recommendations made by Simmons
et al. (2011).
Conclusion
Many researchers—the current authors included—share a
positive view towards the use of ERPs for the detection of
concealed information (see also Iacono 2008). The CIT is
regarded a valid paradigm (Verschuere et al. 2011), the
P300 waveform is a well-established phenomenon resear-
ched in over a thousand peer reviewed publications, and
Table 1 Overview of studies
on brain fingerprinting
published in peer reviewed
journals by Farwell and
colleagues





Farwell and Donchin 1991,
Experiment 1
20 18 (2) 17 (3)
Autobiographical studies
Farwell and Donchin 1991,
Experiment 2
4 4 (0) 3 (1)
Farwell and Smith 2001 6 3 (0) 3 (0)
Total 30 25 (2) 23 (4)
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many studies on the use of ERP for the detection of con-
cealed information have been published in leading peer
reviewed journals. Yet, the publication by Farwell (2012)
has no place in a peer reviewed journal. By selectively
dismissing relevant data, presenting conference abstracts as
published data, and most worrisome, deliberately dupli-
cating participants and studies he misrepresents the scien-
tific status of brain fingerprinting. Thus, the review violates
some of the cherished canons of science and if Dr. Farwell
is, as he claims to be, a ‘‘brain fingerprinting scientist’’ he
should feel obligated to retract the article.
Acknowledgments The first author is funded by an NWO VENI
grant (451-11-038), and a Golda Meir Fellowship.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
References
Ben-Shakhar G, Elaad E (2003) The validity of psychophysiological
detection of deception with the guilty knowledge test: a meta-
analytic review. J Appl Psychol 88:131–151
Donchin E (1981) Surprise!… surprise? Psychophysiology 18:
493–513
Farwell LA (1992) Two new twists on the truth detector: brain-wave
detection of occupational information. Psychophysiology 29:S3
Farwell LA (2008) Brain fingerprinting detects real crimes in the field
despite one-hundred-thousand-dollar reward for beating it.
Psychophysiology 45:S1
Farwell LA (2009). Brain fingerprinting in global security. Presented
at the Global Security Challenge Security Summit, Nov 2009.
London Business School, London
Farwell LA (2012) Brain fingerprinting: a comprehensive tutorial
review of detection of concealed information with event-related
brain potentials. Cogn Neurodyn 6:115–154
Farwell LA, Donchin E (1986) The ‘‘brain detector’’: P300 in the
detection of deception. Psychophysiology 23:434
Farwell LA, Donchin E (1988) Event-related brain potentials in
interrogative polygraphy: analysis using bootstrapping. Psycho-
physiology 25:445
Farwell LA, Donchin E (1991) The truth will out: interrogative
polygraphy (‘‘lie detection’’) with event-related brain potentials.
Psychophysiology 28:531–547
Farwell LA, Richardson DC (2006a) Brain fingerprinting in labora-
tory conditions. Psychophysiology 43:S37–S38
Farwell LA, Richardson DC (2006b) Brain fingerprinting in field
conditions. Psychophysiology 43:S38
Farwell LA, Smith SS (2001) Using brain MERMER testing to detect
knowledge despite efforts to conceal. J Forensic Sci 46:135–143
Farwell LA, Richardson DC, Richardson G (2011) Brain fingerprint-
ing field studies comparing P300-MERMER and P300 ERPs in
the detection of concealed information. Psychophysiology
48:S95–S96
Iacono WG (2008) The forensic application of ‘‘brain fingerprinting:’’
why scientists should encourage the use of P300 memory
detection methods. American Journal of Bioethics 8:30–32
Lykken DT (1959) The GSR in the detection of guilt. J Appl Psychol
43:385–388
Lykken DT (1960) The validity of the guilty knowledge technique:
the effects of faking. J Appl Psychol 44:258–262
Rosenfeld JP (2005) ‘‘brain fingerprinting:’’ a critical analysis. Scient
Rev Mental Health Pract 4:20–37
Rosenfeld JP (2011) P300 in detecting concealed information. In:
Verschuere B, Ben-Shakhar G, Meijer EH (eds) Memory
detection: theory and application of the concealed information
test. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rosenfeld JP, Cantwell B, Nasman VT, Wojdac V, Ivanov S, Mazzeri
L (1988) A modified, event-related potential-based guilty
knowledge test. Int J Neurosci 42:157–161
Simmons JP, Nelson LD, Simonsohn U (2011) False-positive
psychology: undisclosed flexibility in data collection and
analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychol Sci
22:1359–1366
Sutton S, Braren M, Zubin J, John ER (1965) Evoked potential
correlates of stimulus uncertainty. Science 150:1187–1188
Verschuere B, Ben-Shakhar G, Meijer EH (eds) (2011) Memory
detection: theory and application of the concealed information
test. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
158 Cogn Neurodyn (2013) 7:155–158
123
